How Enterprises
Wipe Out Vulnerabilities

Agentic AppSec creates context-aware fixes developers merge. Semantic triage that buys back security team time.
See How it Works

AI Broke
Security

AI accelerated development. Security stayed manual. Every sprint widens the gap.

False Positives
70%+

AI creates vulnerabilities faster than humans can triage.

Average MTTR
252
DAYS

Real vulnerabilities sit waiting. Attackers don't.

Context Driven AppSec
Built for an AI Reality

The end of the security backlog. Agentic resolution platform for modern enterprises.

Automate vulnerability resolution like your team would

Pixee turns scanner noise into validated, prioritized risk, then writes fixes as your developers would. Humans approve every change

Reads your codebase and security context
Turns fix authors into fix reviewers
Eliminates 98% of false positives via exploitability analysis
Get Started
AI
Generic AI
"Use parameterized query here."
const query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1";
</>
Pixee Platform
Context Aware
"Use your existing SafeQueryBuilder class."
SafeQueryBuilder.build(query)
.withParams(params)
.execute();
76%
Merge Rate
98%
Noise Reduction
Minutes
Resolution Time

How Pixee Becomes Your
Autonomous Product Security Engineer

01

Understand Your Real Attack Surface

Pixee reads your codebase, security policies, and architecture. It knows what runs, what's reachable, and what's exposed.

Deep codebase analysis
Security policy integration
Architecture mapping
Execution path tracing
Outcome

Not files. Execution paths.

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Github cat icon
Github cat icon
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02

Identify What Is Actually Vulnerable

Most findings are noise. Pixee traces real execution paths to prove exploitability — removing up to 98% of false positives before fixing anything.

Exploitability analysis
False positive elimination
Evidence-based triage
Personalized risk scores
Outcome

100% filtered. Only real risks remain.

Remote Code Execution
Tiny Pixee icon
Dead Code Path
Hardcoded Credentials
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Mock Code
Path Traversal
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Context-insensitive taint tracking
CVE-2021-23337
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Build tooling only
Unpatched container
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Stale asset inventory
Internet exposed asset contains HIGH sev findings
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Incorrect risk scoring
Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
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Vulnerable function not called
SQL Injection in pgx Driver
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Click to learn more!
Critical
Immediate Action Required   
CVE-2024-27304 — SQL Injection in pgx PostgreSQL Driver
Context Identified
Verified Exploitable
Risk Prioritized
Remediation PR Created
SLA breach: 8 critical findings
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Misattributed ownership
Unpatched container
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Stale asset inventory
Missing CSRF Token
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Framework protections ignored
CVE-2021-23337
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Build tooling only
Remote Code Execution
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Dead Code Path
Path Traversal
Tiny Pixee icon
Context-insensitive taint tracking
Remote Code Execution
Tiny Pixee icon
Dead Code Path
Hardcoded Credentials
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Mock Code
03

Generate Fixes Developers Accept

Every remediation matches your conventions, respects your security rules, and passes CI before opening a PR.

Convention-aware fixes
Ready-to-merge PRs
Security rule compliance
Team-style code generation
Outcome

Backlogs disappear. Happy developers.

Complexity
@router.post("/api/v1/webhooks/test")async def test_webhook(    req: WebhookTestRequest,    user: User = Depends(get_current_user),    policy: OrgPolicy = Depends(get_org_policy),    http: SafeHttpClient = Depends(),):    parsed = urlparse(str(req.url))    # Fix #1 (SEC-POL-007): enforce HTTPS only    if parsed.scheme != "https":        raise ValidationError("Only HTTPS supported")    # Fix #2 (CONTEXT): honor sec allowlist/kill-switch    if not policy.egress_enabled or parsed.hostname not in policy.allowlisted_domains:        raise ValidationError("Org policy blocks this destination")    resolved_ip = await http.safe_resolve(parsed.hostname)    # Fix #3 (COMPLEX): DNS pinning + private-range check
    if ip_address(resolved_ip).is_private orresolved_ip in INFRA_BLOCKLIST:
        logger.warning("SSRF blocked", extra={"user_id": user.id, "host": parsed.hostname})        raise ValidationError("Unable to reach URL")    resp = await http.get(       str(req.url),
       resolved_ip=resolved_ip,  # IP pinning preserves Host header for SNI
       timeout=settings.EXTERNAL_CALL_TIMEOUT, # ADR-0041
       follow_redirects=False,# redirect chain could bypass checks
    )    # CONVENTION: stable response contract
    return {"status": resp.status_code,"latency_ms": resp.elapsed_ms}
04

Learn From Your Team, Continuously

Platform learns from every action until it perfectly mimics your team expertise, conventions, preferences and risk. Bespoke for every customer across:

Your coding conventions
Ingest your policy
Provide feedback in natural language
Human driven reinforcement learning
Outcome

Your autonomous product security engineer.

This change refactors SQL statements to be parameterized, rather than built by hand.

Without parameterization, developers must remember to escape string inputs using the rules for that database. It's usually buggy, at the least -- and sometimes vulnerable.

-
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
-
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name= '" + user + "'");
+
PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?");
+
stmt.setString(1, user);
+
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();

This change refactors SQL statements to be parameterized, rather than built by hand.

Without parameterization, developers must remember to escape string inputs using the rules for that database. It's usually buggy, at the least -- and sometimes vulnerable.

-
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
-
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name= '" + user + "'");
+
PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?");
+
stmt.setString(1, user);
+
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();

This change refactors SQL statements to be parameterized, rather than built by hand.

Without parameterization, developers must remember to escape string inputs using the rules for that database. It's usually buggy, at the least -- and sometimes vulnerable.

-
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
-
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name= '" + user + "'");
+
PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?");
+
stmt.setString(1, user);
+
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();

From Systems of Detection
To Systems of Decision

AppSec

The "What Exists" Layer
SAST
[SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness] [SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness] [SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness]
SCA
[Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS] [Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS] [Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS]
ASPM
[Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic] [Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic] [Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic]
JIRA
[SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit] [SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit] [SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit]
Pixee's Context Graph
The "Why It Happened" Layer

A parallel reality where every security decision leaves a trace.

Not just a snapshot. A history.

Queryable history
replayable decisions
auditable proof

The 4 Layers of Context

How Pixee builds your organization's security memory

Process Context

Security policies, architectural patterns, governance rules.

The "what should happen" layer.

Raw Context

Code, scanner findings, dependencies, configurations.

The "what exists" layer.

Kinetic Context

Exploit verification, reachability analysis, cross-scanner correlation.

The "what is exploitable" layer.

Human Feedback Context

Merge/reject patterns, organizational preferences, precedents.

The "what you trust" layer.
"The question isn't whether AppSec tools survive. It's whether a new layer emerges—a context graph for security decisions—that captures the decision logic between 'vulnerability found' and 'code shipped'."
Surag Patel, Pixee

Stop Managing
Vulnerabilities.
Start Eliminating
Them.

Attackers don't wait for top-100 lists. Dashboards don't reduce risk.

Merged pull requests do.

See How it Works
Get a Demo

What you get

Triage that filters 100% of noise
Fixes that match your code
Every decision logged and provable
76% developer merge rate
Resolution That Lasts